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Abstract 
Using United Nations estimates of age structure and vital rates for nearly 200 nations at five
year intervals from 1950 through 1995, this paper demonstrates how changes in relative cohort size
appear to have affected patterns of fertility across nations since 1950— not just in developed
countries, but perhaps even more importantly in countries as they pass through the demographic
transition.  The increase in relative cohort size (defined as the proportion of the population aged 15
to 24 relative to that aged 25 to 59) which occurs as a result of declining mortality rates among
children and young adults during the demographic transition, appears to act as the mechanism of
transmission which determines when the fertility portion of the transition begins.  As hypothesized
by Richard Easterlin, the increasing proportion of young adults would generate a downward pressure
on young men’s relative wages, which in turn causes young adults to accept a trade-off between
family size and material well-being, setting in motion a “cascade” or “snowball” effect in which total
fertility rates tumble as social norms regarding acceptable family sizes begin to change.  Thus relative
cohort size can be thought of as the mechanism which prevents excessive rates of population
change—  reducing fertility when previous high rates, in combination with low mortality rates, have
caused relative cohort size to increase, and increasing fertility when previous low rates have caused
relative cohort size to decline. 
Introduction
As emphasized by John Caldwell (1997), we still do not possess a “unifying theory” of the
global fertility transition.  We tend to “treat the earlier transitions, unassisted by national family
planning programs, as qualitatively different” from those occurring in the last half-century.  We have
not even been able to develop a unified theory covering fertility transitions in currently developing
countries (Caldwell and Caldwell 1997).  Notestein’s (1953) framework that we all know as the
“demographic transition” has been castigated for its inability to generate explanations for the wide
variation in timing of the fertility transition, relative to the mortality transition, and in rates of decline.
The old maxim  “economic development is the best contraceptive”, favored by economists, has come
increasingly under attack.
I will not attempt a full review of the literature on this topic, which I’m sure is familiar to most
readers.  The purpose of this article is simply to point out an empirical regularity in the global data
that appears to have gone unnoticed, but which synthesizes two hypotheses first put forward by
Richard Easterlin (1966,1969,1978).  The first is his hypothesis that relative cohort size affects male
relative wages, which in turn affect fertility: what I’ll refer to as his relative cohort size (RCS) theory.
The second is the “supply-demand” (SS-DD) framework for explaining fertility in developing nations.
The RCS theory has been the focus of at least 44 studies using developed-nation data
(Macunovich 1998)— but has never been applied in a developing-country context.  Conversely, the
SS-DD framework has been adopted widely as a descriptive tool in studying the fertility transitions
of the past half century, but is not generally associated with fertility patterns in the MDCs.  And while
the RCS theory provides a quantitative mechanism for explaining the fluctuations in demand for
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children which lead to fertility booms and busts, the SS-DD framework, like the theory of the
demographic transition, is limited in that it does not explain why the demand for surviving births
declines when it does.
The data which will be presented here— largely graphically— suggests that the RCS
mechanism applies not just in MDCs but also within the SS-DD framework, providing that missing
explanation.  In many ways my analysis here is embarrassing in its lack of detail, given the breadth
and depth of the literature on the fertility transition.  But in other ways the simplicity of this approach
is its best feature, for in its lack of specificity it consolidates a framework which appears to describe
the genesis of fertility transitions all around the globe, as well as fluctuations in fertility after the
demographic transition has been completed.
Easterlin’s Relative Cohort Size Theory
“The Easterlin, or cohort size, hypothesis posits that, other things constant, the
economic and social fortunes of a cohort (those born in a given year) tend to vary
inversely with its relative size, approximated by the crude birth rate in the period
surrounding the cohort’s birth.  The linkage between higher birth rates and adverse
economic and social effects arises from what might be termed ‘crowding mechanisms’
operating within three major social institutions— the family, school and labour market.
. .”  
This is Richard Easterlin’s definition of the Easterlin hypothesis as presented in The New
Palgrave (1987).  He goes on to describe the labor market mechanism involved: imperfect
substitutability between younger and older workers, leading to a deterioration in the wages of the
young relative to those of the older generation.  Since “a comparison between younger and older
adults of the type just given translates into a comparison of children with their parents,” and “. . .if
parents’ living levels play an important role in setting their children’s material aspirations....then an
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increase in the shortfall of children’s wage rates relative to parents, will cause children to feel
relatively deprived and under greater pressure to keep up.”
He hypothesized that this deterioration in a cohort’s prospects relative to that of its parents
may induce demographic adjustments on the part of the younger generation, including delayed
marriage, reduced fertility, and increased female labor force participation as they seek to maintain
their relative economic status.  In this formulation, it is relative, rather than absolute, income which
is a factor in decision-making— and relative cohort size is seen as the primary determinant of secular
shifts in relative income.
Easterlin (1978) did bring relative income concepts into his discussion of the fertility transition
when he wrote: 
“Because of the substantial upward trend in living levels during economic
development, each generation typically comes from a more prosperous background
than that of the preceding generation.  Because of this, the views of each successive
generation as to the material requisites of the ‘good life’ tend to be progressively
higher.  Goods which to one generation may have been luxuries become necessities
to the next— the automobile is a case in point.  This ‘inter-generation taste effect,’ as
it might be called, tends to raise the minimum living level which parents feel is
necessary before they can ‘afford’ children. . .[T]here is a floor to the curvilinear
indifference map at the minimum required living level.  Below this floor the
indifference lines become horizontal, signifying that welfare depends only on the
parents’ goods and having children adds nothing to satisfaction.  With the progress
of economic growth this ‘subsistence’ floor shifts upward and the marginal rate of
substitution decreases at any given point above the floor, indicating that children
become less attractive relative to goods.  In effect, a third (‘subsistence level’)
constraint is added to the analysis. ..along with the budget line and production
constraints. (p.115)”
But the potential connection between relative cohort size and relative income— and hence
fertility— has been applied only in the post-transition context (Macunovich 1996,1998a,1998d).  It
has not been used to explain the fertility transition.
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The SS-DD Framework
Economists have long discussed the demand for children, but Richard Easterlin (1969,1978)
is generally credited with the formal juxtaposition of the economic concept of demand with the
sociological concept of supply in a framework which incorporated not only the demand for children,
but also the demand for, and costs of, fertility regulation.  Perhaps his most well-known formulation
of this framework is presented in his work with Eileen Crimmins (1985), where it was used to explain
secular shifts in fertility during the demographic transition.
Their stylized framework divided the demographic transition into roughly five phases.  The
initial pre-transition phase is characterized by an excess demand for surviving births due to high
mortality rates and involuntary infecundity.  Declining infant mortality and, possibly, rising
fecundability because of improved health and nutrition during the mortality transition transform this
excess demand into a potential excess supply in the second phase, which in the third phase is
exacerbated by a decline in the demand for children.  This potential for an excess supply motivates
fertility control behavior.  Thus, despite a continued fall in demand, any realized excess supply is
gradually eliminated in a fourth phase, with the length of that phase a function of the cost of fertility
regulation— psychic as well as economic.  The model ends with a rough equilibrium between demand
and achieved supply, despite a potentially very large excess supply.
Within this SS-DD framework the reduced mortality among children and young adults which
in time produces an increase in relative cohort size would add to the potential excess supply of
surviving births in the second phase of this framework, and thus generate additional motivation for
fertility control (assuming that parents wish to have their children survive to adulthood, rather than
just through infancy).  But since this is only a conceptual framework it doesn’t provide any
explanation for the declining demand for children that occurs in the third and fourth phases.  In
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addition to changing norms and attitudes toward children (which still need to be explained),
researchers have suggested changes in the costs and benefits of children, and changing relative prices,
as factors in this decline— but the relationship between changing relative cohort size, and changing
relative income, has not been examined in this context.
Relative Cohort Size Effects— in the Third World?
The mechanism is hypothesized to be similar to that observed in the United States and other
industrialized nations. An excess supply of young relative to prime-age males depresses the relative
wages of the young men, thereby reducing their earning potential relative to their material aspirations
as shaped in their parental households.  And the effects of this labor market crowding may be
exacerbated by crowding in the family, given increasing child survival rates, and in schools to the
extent that they are available.  This decline in relative income would lead young couples to delay or
forego marriage and/or reduce fertility in an attempt to maintain a higher level of per capita disposable
income.  The surprise here is not that we should observe the relative income effect operating on
fertility in newly developing economies, since that relationship appears to be significant in MDCs
(Macunovich 1996,1998d), but rather that such a strong market mechanism should be observable in
LDCs— one which differentiates workers by age and level of experience in order to translate changes
in relative cohort size into changes in relative income.
Undoubtedly institutional and cultural differences among countries must temper the
relationship between relative cohort size and relative income across nations and regions.  Strong
unions, for example, which maintain high wages for current members at the expense of new labor
market entrants (probably as a protective measure during periods of large relative cohort size), would
tend to counteract positive effects of subsequent smaller relative cohort size.  
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Similarly, countries with strong policies encouraging wage cuts rather than layoffs during
periods of excess labor supply might dilute relative cohort size effects, if wage cuts occur across all
experience groups.  Studies have found that while the United States tends to have “sticky wages” that
promote high unemployment during such periods, many European countries trade that unemployment
for lower wages.
Japan, too, must experience more diluted effects of relative cohort size on relative income,
because of widespread adherence to rigid pay scales which are tipped strongly in favor of older more
experienced workers, in order to entice employees into long-term commitment. Here again, young
workers would rarely experience the benefits of smaller cohort size.  This policy appears to have
resulted in Japan’s current low fertility rates despite very small— and declining— relative cohort size.
The rigidity of a nation’s boundaries with respect to immigration, and its policies toward
“guest workers” as for example in Germany, Austria and Oman, would also impinge on the relative
cohort size/wage relationship.  Tests for any relationship would be most appropriate at a regional
rather than a national level, when workers can cross international boundaries fairly freely.  And
conversely, it is possible that very large countries such as China or the former USSR might contain
many sub-national “markets” in which any relative cohort size effects would emerge most
clearly— especially if the movements of their citizens are restricted by government. 
And at the other end of the causal network it goes without saying that cultural and
institutional differences must impinge on the relationship between relative income and factors such
as marriage and childbearing.  These cultural effects may show up only as differences in the overall
levels of marriage and fertility, however, rather than in the response to changing economic
circumstances.
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The Evidence
The United Nations (1998) provides estimates for nearly 200 nations at five year intervals
from 1950 through 1995, of vital statistics and population age structure (the proportion of the total
population aged under 5, 5 to 14, 15 to 24 and 60+).  These data suggest that relative cohort size
(approximated using the ratio of 15 to 24 year olds to those aged 25 to 59 )— probably acting1
through effects on male relative income— has played a crucial role in bringing about the fertility
transition in developing countries during that period.
Countries appear not to begin reducing their fertility, despite reductions in infant mortality,
until mortality rates fall among children and young adults, permitting the proportion of those aged
15 to 24 to rise relative to those aged 25 and over.  This is seen in country after country which has
begun the fertility transition since 1950— more than 100 in all.  Several which have not, such as
Ethiopia, Nigeria and Mozambique, have not yet experienced any increase in the ratio of 15 to 24
year olds to those aged 25 and over, despite marked and prolonged reductions in infant mortality in
many cases. 
It is even common to observe a decline in relative cohort size in most countries immediately
before it begins to increase, suggesting that mortality rates among older adults tend to fall more
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Figure 1: The relationship between the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), relative cohort size (RCS), and infant
mortality ( the unmarked solid line) in various individual countries, 1950-1995.  
Source: United Nations (1998).  RCS = ratio of population aged 15-24 to population aged 25-59; TFR has been
scaled by dividing by 12.5; infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled by logging and dividing by 11.
quickly during the transition, than mortality rates among children and young adults. 
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Figure 2: The relationship between the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), relative cohort size (RCS), and infant
mortality ( the unmarked solid line) in developing regions of the world, 1950-1995.  Source: United Nations
(1998). RCS = ratio of population aged 15to 24 to population aged 25to 59;  TFR has been scaled by dividing
by 12.5;  infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled by logging and dividing by 11.
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Country Infant Mortality Rates
1950-55 1990-95 at the start of the
fertility transition
Barbados 132   9  87
Brazil 135  47 109
China 195  44  81
Egypt 200   67 175
Hong Kong  79    6  33
Iran 190  43  78
North Korea 115  24  58
Thailand 132  32  84
Zimbabwe 120  70 101
Table 1: Infant mortality rates (deaths per 1000 live births)
in countries presented in Figure 4.
The very pronounced relationship between relative cohort size and the Total Fertility Rate is
evident both in the aggregate and in country-specific data, even using data reported at five-year
intervals.  Figure 1 presents graphs for a selection of Third World nations around the globe, where
we can see what will emerge as a characteristic relationship.  We see Total Fertility Rates which are
constant or even increasing until relative cohort size begins to increase: at that point, the Total
Fertility Rate begins to  decline.  Although the overall rate of decline might be affected by the trend
in infant mortality, its point of initiation seems in all cases to be set by the trend in relative cohort size.
This relationship has been demonstrated around the globe, in country after country both small
and large, regardless of religious or political orientation.  Figure 2 shows that it emerges even at the
regional level, in all developing parts of the world.  It is important to note that the characteristic shape
evident in these graphs is not a statistical artifact: the relative cohort size variable used here is
calculated relative only to prime aged adults, not to the total population— thus RCS is not increasing
as a result of the decline in the proportion of children in the population. 
(Scaled) infant mortality rates are also
presented in Figures 1 and 2, and although not
immediately obvious because of the scaling, the levels
vary widely from country to country, both at the
point of initiation of fertility decline, and throughout
its full extent.  Thus, for example, the transition in
Hong Kong did not begin until infant mortality was
down to 33, while in Egypt it began at the very high
level of 175. And although Brazil and Iran exhibit very similar infant mortality rates in 1990-95 (47
and 43, respectively), the TFR in Iran (5.3) is more than twice that in Brazil (2.44).
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Figure 3: Three countries which, by 1995, had shown no signs of beginning the fertility transition.
One might also note other aspects of the diversity among the nine countries in Figure 1.
Population size (in 1995) ranged from only 260,000 in Barbados, to 1.2 billion in China.  Hong Kong
is only a city-state and Barbados only an island, as compared with the large geographic areas of the
other seven countries.  Iran is a predominately Muslim nation, while Brazil has large proportions of
Roman Catholics.  And China and North Korea are not free-market economies— yet they still exhibit
this characteristic pattern.  China’s draconian “one child” policy has been credited by many for
China’s dramatic fertility decline.  However,  several recent studies such as  Lavely and Freedman
(1990) have indicated that the decline began— at least in urban areas— prior to that policy, and the
data presented here suggest that the underlying motivation for such an urban fertility decline was the
increase in relative cohort size.
The Appendix contains graphs for all of the 136 countries which had not experienced a
fertility transition prior to 1950, presented alphabetically by region in Figures A1 to A8.  Nearly all
have by now begun the transition, and conform with the pattern discussed above.  A few have not yet
experienced any fertility decline, as in Figure 3, but many such as Mozambique in Figure 3 appear to
be on the threshold.
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Figure 4: Relative cohort size and the crude birth rate during the fertility transition in England and Wales, France and
Sweden.  (Crude birth rate is births per 1000 population, but is scaled by dividing by 75.  Relative cohort size is the
population aged 15 to 24 relative to the population aged 25 to 59.  Source: Keyfitz and Flieger, 1968).
In addition, Keyfitz and Flieger (1968) provide historical data for three of the currently
industrialized nations around the time of their own fertility transitions: Sweden, France, and England
and Wales.  Although they do not provide the TFR, unfortunately, they do provide information on
age composition, together with the crude birth rate (CBR:  births per 1000 population).  These data
are presented in Figure 4.  Although not as conclusive, perhaps, as the patterns exhibited in most of
the currently developing countries, these graphs do demonstrate a similar tendency for the fertility
transition to begin just at the point where relative cohort size starts to increase.  Only decennial
observations are available for England and Wales, so it’s possible we miss some of the increase there,
but we see a decided increase in RCS in France.  Sweden experienced a sharp jump in RCS after 1825
which seemed to initiate a tendency for fertility to decline, but this was followed by an equally sharp
drop in RCS which generated some recovery in fertility, so that the real fertility transition only
occurred after 1870— when RCS increased once again.
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Figure 5: Probability of surviving to age 15 in England
and Wales, France and Sweden.  (Source: Keyfitz and
Fkieger, 1968).
Figure 6: Three “non-conforming” countries.  The full set is presented in Appendix Tables A9 and A10..
Figure 5 suggests that improved survival
rates among children and young adults was the
primary reason RCS began to increase when it
did in each of these three countries.  The
percent surviving to age 15 began to increase in
1870 in England and Wales— at the same point
that RCS began to increase— whereas both RCS
and the survival probability began to increase
slightly earlier in France, in about 1865.  We
have a much longer history available for Sweden, where we see an explanation for the “on again, off
again” changes in Swedish RCS and fertility between 1825 and 1870.  The survival probabilities of
children and young adults in Sweden increased markedly prior to 1825, producing an increase in RCS
up to about 1840, but then faltered and did not resume their improvement again until after 1870,
coincident with an increase in RCS and the beginning of Sweden’s fertility transition.
Despite the consistent association between fertility and RCS during both historic and recent
fertility transitions, however, there are exceptions to the rule.  Two groups of countries exhibit either
a marked increase in RCS with no accompanying decrease in the TFR (18 countries, presented in
Figure A9), or a marked decline in the TFR with no increase in RCS (Fiji, Kuwait, Mauritius, Qatar,
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Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in Figure A10).  Figure 6 presents a sample of these non-
conforming nations for illustration.
Do these 24 countries invalidate the hypothesis— or are they simply instances in which relative
cohort size is too crudely measured, or is not directly reflected in relative income, for some cultural
or institutional (or economic) reasons ?  It is even possible, in the case of Fiji, Kuwait, Qatar and the
Arab Emirates, that relative income might be hyper-sensitive to changes in relative cohort size: in
each of these cases RCS did rise, but only very briefly and minimally.  It is unfortunate that data are
not available to measure relative income directly in all of these countries, since the hypothesized
relationship is, after all, between relative income and the TFR, rather than directly between RCS and
the TFR.
Statistical Tests
For those who are uncomfortable with a simple visual analysis of the relationship between
RCS and fertility, we can use regression analysis to determine whether the apparent relationship is
statistically significant.  The model we wish to test is very simplistic, containing only RCS and infant
mortality as explanatory variables.  In order to control for the many other factors which are thought
to play a role in fertility determination, we can include a lag of TFR itself, which contains information
about these other factors.  That is, the value of the TFR in time t-1 is used as another variable in
explaining the TFR in time t.  This is a very stringent test, and we will see that infant mortality often
loses its significance under these circumstances— but the estimated effect of RCS remains quite
strong.
Another hurdle has been created in the tests conducted here, by examining only changes in
TFR, RCS and infant mortality.  This has the effect of removing any possible relationship flowing
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Relative Cohort -1.355
Size -0.189
 (-8.0)
infant  0.276
mortality  0.090
 ( 3.1)
lagged TFR  0.371
 0.374
 ( 7.0)
No. of obs   1316
adj R-sq 0.3385
The dependent variable is the first
difference of the Total Fertility
Rate (TFR).
All independent variables are
expressed as first differences.
t-statistics are italicized in
parentheses , and standardized
coefficient estimates are in italics.
Table 2: Estimation of the effect
of relative cohort size and infant
mortality on the Total Fertility
Rate in 189 countries between
1950 and 1995, using OLS
regression.
from past values of fertility and infant mortality to RCS.  That is, generally we would expect to see
lower levels of  RCS when the level of fertility is low, or when the level of infant mortality is high,
and by looking only at changes we remove this potential correlation among levels.  These changes,
or first differences, in the value of each variable are calculated by subtracting the value of each
variable in time t-1 from its value in time t.
Table 2 provides an abbreviated version of the results of this
type of regression analysis, with a more complete set of results in
Appendix Table A1. The results in Table 2 are the estimated effects
of relative cohort size and infant mortality on the Total Fertility
Rate when we include all of the 189 countries in the United
Nations data— the 40 members of the “early transition” group like
the United States. together with Third World countries.  Even
though the lagged TFR exerts a very strong effect, RCS maintains
a very significant estimated coefficient which is more than twice the
absolute magnitude of the estimated (standardized) coefficient on
infant mortality (-0.189 and 0.090, respectively).
Appendix Table A2 presents similar results for various
subsets of the United Nations data: four groups of countries based
on their fertility levels in 1950-55— from high (greater than 6.5
births per woman) to low (3.5 births per woman or less)— and nine groups of countries by
geographical region.  It can be seen in Table A2 that, in all cases except two “outlier”
countries— Niger and Cape Verde in Western Africa— RCS exhibits the expected significant negative
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effect on TFR.  Infant mortality, on the other hand, retains its positive statistical significance in only
4 of the 13 regressions presented in Table A2.
It is interesting to note the very strong effects which are estimated for the Western developed
nations as a group (in Tables A1 and A2): a large and very significant negative effect of relative
cohort size, as hypothesized by Easterlin.  Probably the most significant aspect of relative cohort size
with respect to fertility, however, is its apparently unique identification of the turning point when the
fertility transition is initiated, which is so evident throughout Figures A1-A8.
Asymmetric Effects of Relative Cohort Size on Fertility
But many readers will have noted that the Total Fertility Rate in all countries continues to
decline, once it has started the transition, often despite a subsequent decrease in relative cohort size.
Aren’t the effects of RCS on fertility supposed to be symmetrical, with an increase causing the TFR
to decline and a decrease causing it to rise?  That has been the expectation among academics who
have tested for cohort size effects on fertility in the MDCs (Macunovich 1998a). Why don’t we
observe fertility increasing again in countries during the fertility transition, once relative cohort size
begins to abate? 
However, as demonstrated by Macunovich (1998b,1999a,1999b), relative cohort size effects
on relative income are not symmetrical, because of differential aggregate demand effects on the
leading and lagging edges of a baby boom— thus we should not expect them to be symmetrical in
terms of fertility.   Even if decreasing relative cohort size exerts a positive effect on fertility, that2
positive force is counteracted to some extent by the depressing effect of the economic slowdown
induced by a turnaround in cohort size.
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Perhaps more importantly however, it seems likely that the relative deprivation felt by large
young cohorts in currently developing countries, and their consequent desire to reduce fertility in
order to improve economic status, might mark a turning point in a society’s attitudes with regard to
contraception, and with regard to the individual’s— as opposed to society’s— right to control fertility.
Easterlin (1978) suggested this when he wrote
“It is possible that the emergence of a pressure for fertility limitation is one of the first
forms in which modernization comes to impinge directly on the mass of the
population.  The appearance of a problem that had not previously existed— that of
limiting family size— and thereby the need for decision making of an entirely new sort,
creates a pressure for attitudinal changes in a fundamental and immensely personal
area of human experience.  From this viewpoint the ‘population problem’ may have
positive consequences, by contributing to modernized attitudes that may more
generally favor economic and social development. (p.123)”
He cited Bourgeois-Pichat (1967), Wrigley (1969) and Srinivasan (1972) in describing the shift from
“social sanctions” to “family sanctions” in determining fertility— the development of deliberate
individual control which is a fundamental aspect of modernization.  Cognitive dissonance would lead
to the widespread acceptance of the concept of fertility regulation, and the passing of that milestone
could have a cumulative “snowball” or “cascade” effect, as declining average family size reinforces
a society’s acceptance of smaller numbers of children.  That strong negative “cascade” effect would
also counteract any positive effect on fertility, of declining relative cohort size.
We can test for this type of asymmetry econometrically using the 1998 United Nations
population and fertility data, with an approach similar to the one adopted for relative income in
Macunovich (1998b,1999a,1999b):  we can look at the effect of the rate of change in relative cohort
size, as well as the effect of relative cohort size itself.  The hypothesis is that a positive rate of change
will tend to slow the decline in fertility when cohort size is rising, while a negative rate of change will
tend to dampen fertility increases when cohort size is declining.
-18-
RCS -1.355 -2.038
-0.189 -0.285
 (-8.0) (- 8.3)
RCS change   1.100
 0.176
 ( 4.5)
infant  0.276  0.291
mortality  0.090  0.095
 ( 3.1)  ( 3.3)  
lagged TFR  0.371  0.311
 0.374  0.314
 ( 7.0)    ( 6.6)
No. of obs   1316   1316
adj R-sq 0.3385 0.3464
The dependent variable is the first difference
of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR).
All independent variables are expressed as
first differences.
t-statistics are italicized in parentheses, and
standardized coefficient estimates are in
italics.
Table 3: Estimation of asymmetric effects
of relative cohort size and infant
mortality on the Total Fertility Rate in
189 countries between 1950 and 1995,
using OLS regression.
Our measure of the rate of change in RCS is very
crude, however, since we have only quinquennial
observations between 1950 and 1995, and we hypothesize
that any economic slowdown results not so much from
declining relative cohort size, as from the transition to
decline and its effect on expectations and business
investment.  Five-yearly observations give us only a very
weak identification of that point of transition.  
Despite the weakness in our measure of change in
cohort size, however, there are fairly strong and significant
effects of a change variable, with the expected positive sign,
as demonstrated in Table 3.  Table 3 repeats the results
which were presented in Table 2, and adds in the second
column a set of results in which the basic model is
supplemented with an RCS change variable.  The second
column in Table 3 is, once again, an abbreviated version of regression results which are presented in
full in the Appendix— this time in Table A3.3
In this extended model, the positive effect of the lagged TFR supports the idea of a “cascade”
effect on social norms regarding fertility during the transition, with the declining fertility rate in past
years exerting a strong influence on fertility in subsequent years.  This cascade effect together with
the asymmetry of the relative cohort size effect accounts for the continuing decline of the TFR even
once RCS has begun to decline in these developing nations.
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Conclusions
The attempt here has been to demonstrate that changes in relative cohort size are important
in determining the pattern of fertility— not just in developed countries, but perhaps even more
importantly in countries as they pass through the demographic transition.  The increase in relative
cohort size which occurs as a result of declining mortality rates during the demographic transition,
acts as the mechanism of transmission which determines when the fertility portion of the transition
begins.  The increasing proportion of young adults would generate a downward pressure on young
men’s relative wages, which in turn would cause young adults to accept a trade-off between family
size and material well-being.  This acceptance of a trade-off could mark a turning-point in a society’s
acceptance of contraception, setting in motion a “cascade” or “snowball” effect in which total fertility
rates tumble as social norms regarding acceptable family sizes begin to change.
This seems to be an aspect of the demographic transition which has been overlooked in the
past, because of a focus on absolute rather than relative income, which is apparent in the following
statement from Caldwell and Caldwell (1997:20-21):
“The search for materialist thresholds is frustrating.  If we compare Britain in 1871
with a range of countries in Asia and Africa a century later when their fertility was
beginning to fall or soon would fall, some surprising findings emerge. . .In terms of
real per capita income. . . Britain was at the start of its fertility decline, ten times as
wealthy as Bangladesh, and almost twice as rich as Thailand.  The proportion of its
workforce working outside agriculture was four times that in Bangladesh or Kenya
and more than double Sri Lanka’s proportion.  Its proportion of population living in
conurbations with more than half a million inhabitants was eighteen times the
proportion in Sri Lanka and even six times that in Thailand.”
The evidence presented here suggests that one thing these countries had in common at the point of
transition was increasing relative cohort size.  Countries appear not to begin reducing their fertility,
despite reductions in infant mortality, until mortality rates fall among children and young adults,
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permitting the proportion of those aged 15 to 24 to rise relative to those aged 25 and over.
According to Richard Easterlin’s (1980) hypothesis this would create downward pressure on the
relative wages of young adults, leading them to reduce fertility in order to achieve their desired level
of material aspirations.  This phenomenon is observed in country after country which has begun the
fertility transition since 1950— more than one hundred in all— and evidence suggests that this was the
case in earlier transitions as well.
These results are consistent with the hypotheses put forward by Watkins (1990), who
suggested that “market integration” was one reason for a notable reduction in demographic diversity
in European provinces in the nineteenth century.  Labor market integration would have generated
common trends across provinces in terms of relative cohort size.  Similarly, Coale and Watkins
(1986) found that fertility patterns in various cities in Europe generally resembled those in the cities’
own hinterlands (i.e., market areas) more than they did those in other cities.
Thus, relative cohort size can be thought of as the mechanism which prevents excessive rates
of population change— reducing fertility when previous high rates, in combination with low mortality
rates, have caused relative cohort size to increase, and increasing fertility when previous low rates
have caused relative cohort size to decline.  It appears to have been operating not just in currently
developed post-transition economies, but during both recent and historic fertility transitions, to the
extent that social and economic institutions have permitted the transmission of relative cohort size
effects, to male relative income.
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1. This is unfortunately a fairly crude measure of relative cohort size, since the younger and
older members of the 25 to 59 age group are fairly good substitutes for those aged 15 to 24,
but it is the only measure permitted by the available data.
2. Two effects are important here.  First, as demonstrated in Macunovich (1998c), increases in
relative cohort size produce strong increases in the growth rate of personal consumption
expenditures, which tend to strengthen economic growth and create expectations of further
growth.  When the growth of relative cohort size slows or reverses, these expectations are
not realized, and the resultant cutbacks in investment expenditures and production can cause
dislocations in the economy.  Thus, there is a tendency for economic conditions to be strong
when cohort size is on the increase, and weak when it stops increasing.  And, as demonstrated
in Macunovich (1998b, 1999a,1999b) the wages of young inexperienced workers tend to be
boosted disproportionately in good times and depressed disproportionately in a weak
economy.  The combination of these effects leads to asymmetry in the effects of relative
cohort size on relative wages.
3. Similar effects have been obtained, in results available from the author, using more aggregated
data; that is, when the 1950-1995 data for countries are aggregated up to the United Nations’
20 world regions.
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Lithuania Trinidad and Tobago
Moldova
Poland East, SE and South-Central Asia:
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                   (1)     (2)       (3)     (4)           (5)     (6)     (7)       (8)
                  Full Model with All Interactions             Parsimonious Model
                 Relative Lagged   Infant  Intercept     Relative Lagged  Infant  Intercept
                  Cohort   TFR   Mortality               Cohort    TFR   Mortality
                   Size                                   Size  
Basic model       -1.884    0.373    0.132   -0.071      -1.355    0.371    0.276   -0.057
(First World)     -0.263    0.376    0.043               -0.189    0.374    0.090
                  (-2.7)   ( 3.9)   ( 0.6)   (-1.3)      (-8.0)   ( 7.0)   ( 3.1)   (-2.2)
                  
regional interactions:
                  
South America     -0.177   -0.265    0.254    0.006               -0.170
                  -0.006   -0.089    0.029    0.004               -0.057
                  (-0.2)   (-1.7)   ( 0.5)   ( 0.1)               (-2.2)
                  
Central America    0.828   -0.226    0.445    0.055               -0.113
  & Caribbean      0.041   -0.104    0.082    0.044               -0.052
                  ( 0.9)   (-1.6)   ( 1.0)   ( 0.6)               (-1.8)
                  
East, SE &         1.083   -0.392    0.449    0.032               -0.270
South-Central      0.089   -0.267    0.108    0.034               -0.184
Asia              ( 1.3)   (-3.1)   ( 1.2)   ( 0.4)               (-5.3)
                  
West Asia &        1.048   -0.030    0.240    0.134
North Africa       0.068   -0.012    0.048    0.118
                  ( 1.1)   (-0.2)   ( 0.6)   ( 1.4)
                  
East Africa        0.566    0.068    0.051    0.176                                  0.121
                   0.013    0.015    0.004    0.129                                  0.089
                  ( 0.4)   ( 0.4)   ( 0.1)   ( 1.8)                                 ( 3.5)
                  
Middle, West &     1.255    0.101    0.794    0.601                         0.565    0.532
Southern           0.029    0.021    0.102    0.163                         0.073    0.144
Africa            ( 0.9)   ( 0.6)   ( 1.7)   ( 2.2)                        ( 2.0)   ( 2.1)
                  
Niger &            4.407   -0.681    6.646    0.280       4.033   -0.655    6.432    0.240
Cape Verde         0.128   -0.091    0.178    0.263       0.117   -0.088    0.172    0.225
                  ( 3.3)   (-2.4)   ( 2.3)   ( 3.1)      ( 4.0)   (-2.6)   ( 2.3)   ( 6.2)
                  
Second World       0.969   -0.494   -0.009   -0.034               -0.424
                   0.042   -0.135   -0.002   -0.029               -0.116
                  ( 1.2)   (-3.8)   ( 0.0)   (-0.5)               (-4.5)
fertility-level interactions:
                  
  3.51 - 5.5      -0.815    0.107   -0.038   -0.167                                 -0.163
                  -0.063    0.061   -0.009   -0.161                                 -0.157
                  (-1.0)   ( 0.8)   (-0.1)   (-2.1)                                 (-5.6)
                  
  5.51 - 6.5      -0.573    0.343   -0.947   -0.248                0.261   -0.696   -0.213
                  -0.038    0.207   -0.217   -0.291                0.158   -0.159   -0.250
                  (-0.6)   ( 2.5)   (-2.5)   (-2.9)               ( 4.4)   (-3.8)   (-5.7)
                  
  >6.5             0.155    0.407   -0.071   -0.152                0.384            -0.097
                   0.013    0.264   -0.017   -0.192                0.249            -0.123
                  ( 0.2)   ( 2.9)   (-0.2)   (-1.8)               ( 6.5)            (-3.5)
Number of obs                                 1316                                    1316
F-Statistic                                  15.55                                   34.65
Adjusted R-square                           0.3422                                  0.3385
__________________________
excluding Niger and Cape Verde*
Dependent variable is the year-to-year change in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR).
Relative Cohort Size is the ratio of population aged 15-24 to those aged 25-59.
All variables expressed as first differences.
t-statistics in italics and parentheses, standardized coefficients in italics below estimated
coefficients.
Appendix Table A1: Estimated effects of a change in Relative Cohort Size (RCS) on the
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 189 countries between 1950-1995, using an aggregate time-
series cross-section model with full interaction terms for eight regions and three 1950-
55 fertility levels.
                         (1)            (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)
                      Relative        Lagged          Infant         Intercept       No.of obs
                    Cohort Size         TFR          Mortality                      (Adj.R-sq)
By Region:
South America          -2.041 (-2.9)   0.526 ( 5.5)   -0.043 (-0.1)   -0.221 (-3.5)     84 
                       -0.286          0.570          -0.012                         (0.2668)
Central America        -1.531 (-3.0)   0.408 ( 5.4)    0.262 ( 1.0)   -0.213 (-3.6)    133
  & Caribbean          -0.233          0.448           0.079                         (0.2335)
East, SE &             -1.352 (-3.1)   0.258 ( 4.5)    0.077 ( 0.4)   -0.259 (-5.6)    280
South-Central Asia     -0.185          0.264           0.021                         (0.0799)
West Asia &            -0.947 (-2.7)   0.728 (11.3)    0.379 ( 2.1)   -0.070 (-1.7)    168
North Africa           -0.162          0.669           0.126                         (0.4335)
East Africa            -1.298 (-1.6)   0.772 ( 9.4)   -0.256 (-0.9)   -0.072 (-2.2)    112
                       -0.121          0.696          -0.064                         (0.4352)
Middle, West &         -1.136 (-2.1)   0.796 (13.5)    0.070 ( 0.5)   -0.026 (-1.5)    196
Southern Africa         -0.106          0.727           0.028                         (0.5245)*
Niger &                 2.679 ( 2.4)   0.099 ( 0.4)    6.708 ( 2.2)    0.378 ( 1.3)     14
Cape Verde              0.555          0.095           0.479                         (0.5779)
Second World           -0.978 (-2.6)   0.033 ( 0.5)    0.183 ( 1.3)   -0.113 (-3.6)    156
                       -0.208          0.039           0.107                         (0.0407)
First World            -2.044 (-4.5)   0.473 ( 7.9)   -0.024 (-0.1)   -0.125 (-3.3)    173
                       -0.294          0.518          -0.010                         (0.2963)
By fertility level in 1950-55:
  <= 3.5               -0.965 (-2.7)   0.187 ( 3.2)    0.137 ( 1.2)   -0.085 (-3.4)    280
                       -0.158          0.191           0.073                         (0.0641)
Appendix Table A2: Estimates for 1950-1995 of the effects of a change in Relative Cohort
Size (RCS) on the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 189 countries grouped by region and by
fertility level in 1950-55.
                  (1)    (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)        (6)     (7)     (8)     (9)     (10)
                    Full Model with All Interactions                Parsimonious Model
               Relative Change  Lagged  Infant  Inter-    Relative Change  Lagged  Infant   Inter-
                Cohort    in     TFR   Mortality cept      Cohort    in     TFR   Mortality  cept
                 Size    RCS                                Size     RCS 
Basic model     -2.805   1.806   0.350   0.162  -0.064     -2.038   1.100   0.311   0.291  -0.057
(First World)   -0.392   0.289   0.353   0.053       .     -0.285   0.176   0.314   0.095       .
                (-3.4)  ( 2.3)  ( 3.7)  ( 0.7)  (-1.2)     (-8.3)  ( 4.5)  ( 6.6)  ( 3.3)  (-2.2) 
regional interactions:                                                                             
South America    0.168   0.277  -0.272   0.194  -0.010                     -0.147        
                 0.005   0.007  -0.091   0.022  -0.007                     -0.049        
                ( 0.1)  ( 0.2)  (-1.7)  ( 0.4)  (-0.1)                     (-2.0)        
Central          2.024  -2.041  -0.130   0.271   0.044             -1.096                
  America &      0.101  -0.106  -0.060   0.050   0.035             -0.057                
  Caribbean     ( 1.8)  (-1.9)  (-0.9)  ( 0.6)  ( 0.5)             (-2.3)                
East, SE &       1.617  -0.976  -0.342   0.408   0.030                     -0.247        
South-Central    0.133  -0.092  -0.233   0.098   0.032                     -0.169        
Asia            ( 1.5)  (-1.0)  (-2.6)  ( 1.0)  ( 0.3)                     (-5.5)        
West Asia &      2.207  -1.837   0.039   0.129   0.123      0.840  -0.843                
North Africa     0.143  -0.152   0.016   0.026   0.108      0.054  -0.070                
                ( 2.0)  (-1.8)  ( 0.3)  ( 0.3)  ( 1.3)     ( 1.7)  (-2.0)                
 East Africa      0.728   0.059   0.118   0.002   0.177                                      0.120
                 0.017   0.001   0.026   0.000   0.130                                      0.088
                ( 0.4)  ( 0.0)  ( 0.7)  ( 0.0)  ( 1.8)                                    ( 3.5)
Middle, West     1.870  -1.049   0.165   0.721   0.562                              0.598   0.247
& Southern       0.043  -0.025   0.035   0.093   0.152                              0.077   0.232
Africa          ( 1.1)  (-0.7)  ( 0.9)  ( 1.5)  ( 2.1)                             ( 2.2)  ( 6.4)
Niger &          3.786   0.814  -0.452   5.576   0.279      3.966          -0.550   6.008   0.516
Cape Verde       0.110   0.023  -0.061   0.150   0.262      0.115          -0.074   0.161   0.140
                ( 2.3)  ( 0.6)  (-1.6)  ( 2.0)  ( 3.1)     ( 3.9)          (-2.2)  ( 2.1)  ( 2.0)
Second World     2.412  -2.377  -0.422  -0.144  -0.047      1.090  -1.355  -0.375        
                 0.104  -0.135  -0.116  -0.029  -0.040      0.047  -0.077  -0.103        
                ( 2.4)  (-2.7)  (-3.2)  (-0.5)  (-0.7)     ( 1.6)  (-2.5)  (-4.1)
fertility-level interactions:                                                        
  3.51 - 5.5    -1.197   0.445   0.021   0.126  -0.161                                     -0.166
                -0.093   0.039   0.012   0.030  -0.156                                     -0.161
                (-1.2)  ( 0.5)  ( 0.2)  ( 0.4)  (-2.1)                                     (-5.7)
   5.51 - 6.5    -0.468  -0.413   0.304  -0.915  -0.253                      0.266  -0.715  -0.215
                -0.031  -0.029   0.184  -0.209  -0.297                      0.161  -0.164  -0.252
                (-0.4)  (-0.4)  ( 2.2)  (-2.3)  (-3.0)                     ( 4.5)  (-3.9)  (-5.8)
                                                                                         
  >6.5          -0.086  -0.008   0.363  -0.002  -0.150                      0.407          -0.094
                -0.007  -0.001   0.236  -0.001  -0.189                      0.264          -0.118
                (-0.1)  ( 0.0)  ( 2.5)  ( 0.0)  (-1.7)                     ( 6.9)          (-3.4)
Number of obs                                     1316                                       1316
F-Statistic                                      13.06                                      28.87
Adjusted R-square                               0.3512                                     0.3464
__________________________
excluding Niger and Cape Verde*
Dependent variable is the year-to-year change in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR).
Relative Cohort Size is the ratio of population aged 15-24 to those aged 25-59.
All variables expressed as first differences.
t-statistics in italics and parentheses, standardized coefficients in italics below estimated
coefficients.
Appendix Table A3: Estimated effects, allowing for asymmetry, of a change in Relative
Cohort Size (RCS) on the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 189 countries between 1950-1995,
using an aggregate time-series cross-section model with full interaction terms for eight
regions and three 1950-55 fertility levels.
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Appendix Figure A1: South American countries in transition: the relationship between the Total Fertility
Rate (TFR), relative cohort size (RCS), and infant mortality, 1950-1995.  
Source: United Nations (1998).  RCS = ratio of population aged 15-24 to population aged 25-59; TFR has been
scaled by dividing by 12.5; infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled by logging and dividing by 11.
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Appendix Figure A2 : Central American and Caribbean countries in transition: the relationship between the
Total Fertility Rate (TFR), relative cohort size (RCS), and infant mortality, 1950-1995.  
Source: United Nations (1998).  RCS = ratio of population aged 15-24 to population aged 25-59; TFR has been
scaled by dividing by 12.5; infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled by logging and dividing by 11
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Appendix Figure A3: South_Central Asian countries in transition: the relationship between the Total Fertility
Rate (TFR), relative cohort size (RCS), and infant mortality (the solid unmarked line), 1950-1995.  Source:
United Nations (1998).  RCS = ratio of population aged 15-24 to population aged 25-59; TFR has been scaled by
dividing by 12.5; infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled by logging and dividing by 11.
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Appendix Figure A4: East and South-East Asian countries in transition: the relationship between the Total
Fertility Rate (TFR), relative cohort size (RCS), and infant mortality (the solid unmarked line), 1950-1995.
Source: United Nations (1998).  RCS = ratio of population aged 15-24 to population aged 25-59; TFR has been
scaled by dividing by 12.5; infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled by logging and dividing by 11.
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Appendix Figure A5: Pacific Islands in transition: the relationship between the Total Fertility Rate (TFR),
relative cohort size (RCS), and infant mortality (the solid unmarked line), 1950-1995.  
Source: United Nations (1998).  RCS = ratio of population aged 15-24 to population aged 25-59; TFR has been
scaled by dividing by 12.5; infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled by logging and dividing by 11.
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Appendix Figure A6: West Asian and North African countries (and Albania)  in transition: the relationship
between the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), relative cohort size (RCS), and infant mortality, 1950-1995.  Source:
United Nations (1998).   RCS = ratio of population aged 15-24 to population aged 25-59; TFR has been scaled by
dividing by 12.5; infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled by logging and dividing by 11.
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Appendix Figure A7: Western , Middle, and Southern African countries in— or approaching—  transition:
the relationship between the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), relative cohort size (RCS), and infant mortality (solid
unmarked line), 1950-1995.  Source: United Nations (1998).   RCS = ratio of population aged 15-24 to population
aged 25-59; TFR has been scaled by dividing by 12.5; infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled b y
logging and dividing by 11.
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Appendix Figure A8: East African countries in— or approaching— transition: the relationship between the
Total Fertility Rate (TFR), relative cohort size (RCS), and infant mortality (solid unmarked line), 1950-1995.
Source: United Nations (1998).   RCS = ratio of population aged 15-24 to population aged 25-59; TFR has been
scaled by dividing by 12.5; infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled by logging and dividing by 11.
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Appendix Figure A9: Countries which do not fit the standard pattern of the relationship between the Total
Fertility Rate (TFR), relative cohort size (RCS), and infant mortality in developing regions of the world, 1950-
1995.  Source: United Nations (1998).  RCS = ratio of population aged 15-24 to population aged 25-59; TFR has
been scaled by dividing by 12.5; infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled by logging and dividing by
11.
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Appendix Figure A10: Countries which began the fertility transition with a declining RCS , 1950-1995.   
Source: United Nations (1998).  RCS = ratio of population aged 15-24 to population aged 25-59; TFR has been
scaled by dividing by 12.5; infant mortality (in deaths per 1000) has been scaled by logging and dividing by 11.
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